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 “The New New Deal – What Barack Obama can learn from F.D.R. – and what 
Democrats need to do” was the feature story in the November 24, 2008 issue Time 
magazine, which hit the newsstands not long after the historic 2008 elections.  A 
striking mock picture appeared on the magazine cover -- showing Obama wearing a 
fedora and riding F.D.R.-style in an open convertible car, a cigarette in a silver 
holder dangling from his grinning lips.  The cover story caught the mood of the 
moment, as many commentators suggested that the nation’s first African-American 
President might have the potential to redirect U.S. public policies in a way 
comparable to the shift in direction marked by the New Deal of the 1930s. Put 
another way, it seemed that the Obama administration and the Democratic Party 
might begin to use public programs and tax measures to mitigate and reverse trends 
toward greater inequality that have marked American society in recent decades.   
Obama’s presidency could be pivotal in the same way as F.D.R. and Ronald Reagan 
before him, shifting the role of government in U.S. life. 
 In this article, we first examine why the Obama presidency seemed poised to 
redirect U.S. domestic policy and probe the forces working for and against the 
accomplishment of major transformations.  After delineating the overall context, we 
consider in detail the case of health reform where, in a White House ceremony on 
March 23, 2010, President Obama capped a year-long uphill battle by signing into 
law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act -- legislation characterized by 
New York Times columnist David Leonhardt as “the federal government’s biggest 
attack on economic inequality since inequality began rising more than three decades 
ago,” because it trims tax breaks and business subsidies and taxes the wealthy to 
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pay for benefits that “flow mostly to households making less than four times the 
poverty level -- $88,200 for a family of four people.”1  The case study of health care 
reform tells us quite a bit about what it takes to shift U.S. public policies in the 
direction of enhancing security for lower-income and lower-middle-income 
Americans.  Furthermore, we will look forward, pinpointing the obstacles remaining 
to the full implementation of Obama’s health reforms in a U.S. polity racked with 
partisan polarization and public anxieties about a prolonged economic downturn.  
Again, the health reform scenario reveals the contending forces at work in U.S. 
domestic policy today. 
 
Why Did Another New Deal Seem Possible? 
 
 Let’s remind ourselves of how the political terrain looked in late 2008 and 
early 2009. There were a number of reasons to believe that the November 2008 
election had opened the door to more than incremental or routine shifts in U.S. 
public policy and politics.  
First, the election outcomes themselves were remarkable.  Most elections for 
years prior to 2008 had ended up in virtual stalemates, virtually tied between 
Democrats and Republicans. But Barack Obama won quite decisively, especially for 
a Democrat in recent memory.  His margin over John McCain was 53% to 46% in the 
total popular vote, and 365 to 173 in the Electoral College. At the same time, 
Congressional Democrats strengthened their margins in both the House and the 
Senate — carrying forward a partisan shift that started in 2006.  The Democratic 
margin kept growing in the Senate, and eventually, mid-way through 2009, when 
the protracted court battles in Minnesota were finally settled, the Democrats plus 
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two Independents ended up with what the media trumpeted as a “filibuster proof” 
super-majority in the Senate.  
The U.S. elections of 2006 and 2008 were also marked by the mobilization of 
new blocs of voters into greater participation, as well as enhanced support for the 
Democratic Party.  Younger voters raised their level of engagement; African 
Americans turned out in droves to vote for the first African American presidential 
candidate; and Latino voters increased their level of participation and shifted 
toward a greater margin of support for Democrats.  After the November 2008 
election, commentators especially noted the age-gradient of partisan divisions, and 
trumpeted the Democratic Party, preferred by under-45-year-olds, as the party of 
the future. 
Obama also enjoyed an advantage that has been underlined in the research 
of political scientist Stephen Skowronek on the sequence of presidencies across U.S. 
history.2  Obama arrived at the presidency at a juncture when most Americans of all 
political persuasions were disillusioned with his predecessor, George W. Bush, and 
soured on the economic and foreign policy directions the country had taken under 
the sway of the Republican Party (which controlled both Congress and the 
Presidency from 2000 through 2006).  For a change-oriented President, this is the 
ideal situation: to come to office backed by his own party after the country has 
“repudiated” his predecessor.   
In addition, some analysts would say that it is good for a President who 
wants to use federal power vigorously to come to office during a deep economic 
downturn, when businesses and people are more open to government help. During 
the original New Deal, certainly, President Franklin Roosevelt the Democratic Party 
were able to do a lot amidst the massive Great Depression; and Barack Obama took 
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office just as an epochal financial meltdown was plunging the country into the Great 
Recession, the deepest economic downturn since the 1930s.  Certainly, the advent of 
this crisis helped Obama and the Democrats build their margins of electoral victory 
against McCain and the Republicans in the 2008 election.  
Finally, Obama came to office after being unusually straightforward with the 
public that he would seek to change the direction of federal social and fiscal policies.  
During the general election and the interminable Democratic Party primaries, 
Obama had actually spoken about redistributive issues in a way highly unusual for 
any Democratic Presidential nominee in recent memory. He talked quite frankly 
about the need to do more to help average Americans, and he didn’t even back off 
from the proposition that rich families, making more than $250,000 a year, should 
pay higher taxes.  No Democratic presidential candidate since the ill-fated Walter 
Mondale has been willing to talk about raising taxes on anyone. 
 
Caveats and Obstacles to Change 
 
  Even at the height of the hoopla over a possible “New New Deal,” many 
members of the political science profession, especially numbers-crunchers, sounded 
notes of caution. It is a well-known regularity that electoral outcomes tend to swing 
back and forth, especially in midterm Congressional elections held when one party 
has control of the presidency and both Houses of Congress.  Older, richer, and whiter 
voters, moreover, are the ones most likely to appear at the polls in mid-term 
elections – and these were, all along, the demographics least enamored of Barack 
Obama.  In addition, it has long been well documented in survey research that 
Americans are ideologically cautious about strong government or governmental 
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activism.  From the very beginning of mass surveys, researchers have noted that if 
you ask Americans abstract questions such as “do you believe in government or the 
market?,” they favor the free market. If you ask them specific questions, such as “do 
you support Social Security, do you favor education payments?” and so forth, they 
tend to support active government. Americans have long been philosophical 
conservatives and operational liberals.3  This remains true and means that, even if 
the public may approve of many steps taken by President Obama and the 
Democrats, the reflexive anti-government worries of Americans can also be invoked 
by the political opponents of new measures. 
 During the first few months of the Obama presidency it appeared that the 
optimists, those who thought that this was a moment for major changes, were 
probably right. Obama started out with sky-high public approval ratings, and 
quickly persuaded Congress to pass the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(the so-called “Stimulus”) that was not as large or as bold as progressives wanted to 
see, but nevertheless injected nearly a trillion dollars into the economy and included 
“down payments” on new policy initiatives in education, clean energy production, 
and health care.  In health care, the fledgling Obama Administration also quickly 
signed into law expansions of health insurance for children that had been vetoed 
under President Bush. What is more, the first Obama budget was a bold and 
readable document, not the usual snoozy bureaucratic treatise. It outlined a very 
broad vision of how the new President planned to address major issues in education, 
health care, and energy and the environment. It called for regulatory shifts and new 
directions in taxing and spending -- away from providing subsidies to favored private 
industries and tax cuts for the very wealthy; and toward broadening access to higher 
education, stimulating K-12 school reform, paying for health insurance for all 
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Americans, and encouraging a new kind of environmental and energy policy.  
But from the early weeks of the Obama presidency, there were also signs that 
changing directions in these ways would not be easy. With the national economy 
plunging into recession, the Republican Party nevertheless decided to go all-out in 
opposition to Obama’s leadership.  The White House devoted a major portion of the 
original Stimulus legislation to tax cuts for business, but in return got virtually no 
votes from Congressional Republicans, even as their home states clamored for fiscal 
relief.  As the months went by, Republican opposition hardened – and grassroots 
populist movements arrayed under the banner of the Tea Party took to the streets to 
excoriate the President and federal initiatives being debated in Congress.  
Though the press has emphasized Obama’s “supermajority” in the Senate, 
the Democratic majority was remarkable only by quite recent standards. 
Throughout his presidential term, Jimmy Carter had a stronger Senate majority 
than Obama, and Clinton started his first term with 57 Democratic Senators. FDR 
and Lyndon Johnson had much larger majorities to work with when they pushed 
through far-reaching social programs – though back then, of course, many 
Democrats were southern conservatives. In any case, almost a year to the day after 
he was inaugurated, Obama watched his nominal supermajority disappear, as Tea 
Party darling Republican Scott Brown scored an upset victory to take the Senate 
seat formerly held by deceased liberal champion Ted Kennedy.   This happened in 
the nation’s most liberal and reliably Democratic state, and blue-collar workers 
disaffected by a sluggish economy and worried about health reform bills being 
debated in Washington DC gave more of their votes to Scott Brown than to the 
Democratic nominee.  Apparently, the “New New Deal” that appeared possible in 
early 2009 was dead in its tracks by early 2010. And this included comprehensive 
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health reform, which had been debated in Congress for nine months and was on the 
verge of final enactment when Scott Brown won the Massachusetts Special Election 
and promised to go Washington and block final passage (as the 41st Republican vote 
needed to sustain a filibuster in the Senate).  
 
Comparing Two New Deal Periods 
 
 Comparisons across time to that first New Deal can further deepen our sense 
of the obstacles Obama and the Democrats of 2009 and 2010 face. A crucial 
difference has to do with the timing of economic crisis relative to the arrival of a 
change-oriented Democratic president in the 1933 versus 2009.  FDR took office 
several years into the Great Depression, when the U.S. economy was at a nadir, 
some 25% of Americans were unemployed, and the nation was begging for strong 
federal action. But Obama took office amidst a financial crisis and just as a massive 
recession was starting.  Because FDR took charge at a moment of despair, 
Congressional Democrats and Republicans alike, southerners and northerners alike, 
voted for emergency bills he proposed before they even saw the written texts!4  In 
contrast, Obama’s steps to spur recovery met a nearly universal wall of Republicans 
in Congress determined to “just say no” to anything he favored.   
This was a cold-blooded political bet by Republicans, made possible because 
the Great Recession was just starting, and came on the heels of Wall Street bailout 
undertaken by the outgoing Bush administration. The bailout was unpopular, and 
Congressional Republicans, who had largely supported it under Bush, nevertheless 
saw a chance to pin the bailout on Obama (indeed to try to convince the public that 
the bailout and the stimulus were one and the same). Republican strategists also 
 8 
knew that unemployment was starting to skyrocket, and would remain high for a 
long time. If unemployment were to remain high all the way to November 2010, 
Republicans hoped to position themselves as the only alternative to Democrats. They 
did not want to be partners in early recovery steps.  For Obama, it was as if he had 
to hold hands with Herbert Hoover, because of the timing of the economic downturn 
relative to his inauguration, and because his administration was of necessity 
involved in the early steps to stabilize Wall Street.  Obama and the Democrats 
ended up facing the anxiety of Americans over a steep and stubborn Great 
Recession, without benefiting from the sort of boost in support for federal activism 
that FDR and his Congressional allies enjoyed at the depths of economic troubles in 
the 1930s.  Obama also inherited a huge federal budget deficit from George W. Bush, 
who waged wars and expanded Medicare benefits at the same time that he pushed 
through a huge tax cut for the wealthy.  Deficit worries have only grown under 
Obama, given the price tag of the economic recovery measures more or less forced 
upon him. 
The partisan and media climates of the mid-1930s versus 2009-10 also 
differed in telling ways.  Both FDR and Obama are presidents who tried to use the 
new technologies of their time to talk directly to the American people. Facing nearly 
unanimous opposition from the editorial boards of major newspapers, FDR used 
those “fireside chats” on the radio to get into the ears of ordinary Americans very 
regularly. President Obama has used YouTube presidential addresses that watched 
each week by millions of Americans at the click of a computer; and he has used 
television appearances or interviews to reach people and get around much of the 
reporter filter in other ways. But here the similarities end, because Obama faces a 
fragmented media environment that gives voice to extreme voices very easily. And 
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partisan polarization along divide between Republicans and Democrats as such is 
much more extreme now than it was in the 1930s.  Back then, there were liberal 
Republicans and, of course, a large bloc of conservative Southern and Midwestern 
Democrats.  Now conservatives and liberals are almost entirely sorted out along 
party lines.  This does matter, because today’s multiple media outlets look for 
extreme voices and controversy, and even mainstream outlets look for “balance” 
between the two parties.   The end result is that Obama’s White House faces a 
constant cacophony of highly publicized right-wing condemnations, above all on Fox 
News, combined with efforts by other outlets to balance every Democratic voice with 
a Republican voice. Democrats moreover, encompass a wide spectrum, from 
conservatives through centrists to liberals, while Republicans are overwhelmingly – 
and increasingly – militant right-wingers.  From the very beginning, Obama faced 
opponents who had both the means and the will to disseminate colorful and vivid 
messages in opposition to him and to his party very quickly.  
  The biggest difference between the 1930s and now – and the one that matters 
most as we move toward analyzing the effort to do health care reform – has to do 
with the nature of preexisting domestic policies. Back in the 1930s, the New Dealers 
in Congress and in the FDR Administration were advocating new kinds of federal 
government interventions—financial regulations, social policies like minimum wage 
and maximum hour rules, benefits like Social Security, unemployment insurance, 
and welfare payments, and new rights for labor unions to organize.  Previously, the 
U.S. federal government had become very active in economic and social affairs only 
temporarily during major wars, so the New Dealers, amidst a massive Great 
Depression, were advocating a series of innovative permanent peacetime 
interventions.  They were selling new ideas in an emergency.  But think about the 
 10 
contrast for any fresh New Deal now.  Obama and his Democratic majorities 
promised new frameworks for the U.S. economy and social programs – but not first-
time interventions. They came to office following a half-century of previous 
accretions of pervasive regulatory and fiscal interventions into society and the 
economy.  
 You can turn on the television almost any day and hear pundits declare that 
we in the early twenty-first century are fighting about “government” versus “the 
market.” But this is nonsense. Over the past six decades, Democrats and 
Republicans alike in Washington D.C. have sponsored and presided over more or 
less steady increases in taxes and tax subsidies, regulatory interventions, social 
spending, and the like. Both parties have participated in the building up of a 
massive, ramified, expensive, and pervasive subsidy and regulatory state.5 It is true 
that Democrats on the margin tilt the tax advantages and the subsidies to the 
working and middle class, and it is certainly true that Republicans since 1980 have 
mainly tilted those subsidies and advantages toward favored industries and very 
wealthy taxpayers. But neither party has really cut back. Every region of the United 
States, and every industry and social stratum, has a stake in some aspect of existing 
federal interventions into the economy and the society.  
 So when a change-oriented president like Obama arrives in Washington 
aiming to transform, in some big way, the scale and redistributive impact and the 
import of federal government interventions, he is not starting from scratch like FDR 
and the New Dealers did. He is redirecting resources, asking some people who are 
already the beneficiaries of regulatory advantages, governmental subsidies or 
benefits, or tax breaks to accept less. Those asked to give up something will be quite 
alert to their potential disadvantage, and quick to mobilize against change -- while 
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people who might benefit from rearrangements in some hypothetical future are 
likely to be skeptical, and certainly not yet concretely accustomed to the new 
advantages they could enjoy.  The disparity of mobilization only becomes worse 
when the previously advantaged are wealthier and/or better organized, while the 
potential beneficiaries are lower or lower-middle income Americans who may not 
even vote regularly.  
 This dilemma has bedeviled the Obama project from the very beginning, 
although there are some policy realms were change has been a bit easier than in 
others. Obama’s promise to end the Bush Jr. tax breaks for the very wealthy did 
have a certain advantage – to carry it out, all that was required was for Congress to 
take no action, because a number of the original Bush tax-cut provisions were set to 
expire automatically.  Even so, it is hard for Obama to keep even Democrats in 
Congress from voting to extend tax breaks to wealthy supporters.  Yet he must do so 
if he is to have any resources to shift toward tax cuts or benefits for the majority of 
Americans.  By contrast, in most of the policy areas where Obama aims to move 
federal policies in new directions, he cannot not just use “expiration dates” to get 
things done. Especially if he wants to control costs, he necessarily must propose 
higher taxes on the privileged or cut backs in subsidies or benefits to entrenched 
interests, in order to free up resources for new social measures.   
Take higher education loans, for example.6  The United States has fallen to 
tenth or eleventh place in the proportion of our youthful population who earn college 
degrees, and in large part this is because the cost of college is too high, or too 
unpredictable, for lower-income and lower-middle-income families.   Over recent 
decades, moreover, federal higher education subsidies, and state subsidies too, have 
been diverted toward middle class families and away from grants to lower-income 
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students.   Federal monies have also been used to subsidize guaranteed profits to 
middleman banks who lend to students.  If students, after college, fail to repay their 
loans, the federal government picks up the cost. So banks enjoy guaranteed profits.  
A key Obama administration proposal was to get rid of these guaranteed profits to 
private bankers, and have the government deliver loans directly to students through 
the colleges.  This would save tens of billions of dollars a year – and Obama proposed 
to use the savings to make Pell Grants and lower-cost loans more available to less 
privileged Americans, and to subsidize community colleges. In a way, this was a 
simple idea, almost a no-brainer.  Save money wasted on banks that provide very 
little public benefit, and redirect the resources toward expanded social opportunity.   
But, of course, banks and their supporters in Congress were strongly opposed to 
giving up subsidized profits!  For many months, this Obama administration proposal 
was stalled in Congress  -- unable to overcome a Senate filibuster, because 
conservative Democrats like Senator Ben Nelson of Nebraska were determined to 
join Republicans in opposition, in order to defend the established subsidies enjoyed 
by private lenders prominent in their states.  (In the end, a version of student loan 
reform passed only because, as we describe below, it was bundled with the final 
steps in health reform in a bill that could pass the Senate as well as the House by 
simple majority.) 
  The instance of higher education funding makes it easy to understand how 
difficult it is to legislate even a modest redirection of existing federal expenditures, 
away from subsidizing privilege and toward expanding opportunity.  It does not 
matter how “logical” such a shift seems; it is much harder than creating a new 
federal program in the first place. At this point in U.S. history, any fresh New Deal 
involving redirection of federal interventions in an equality-enhancing direction is a 
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much more fraught undertaking than an original New Deal.  Many additional 
examples of such dilemmas appeared in the 2009-10 struggle for comprehensive 
health care reform, to which we now turn.7 
 
Enacting Comprehensive Health Reform in an Entrenched System 
 
Before 2010, powerful entrenched interests had defeated health care reform 
in America for almost one hundred years. The first attempt at broad health 
insurance was in the 1910s, scotched by the insurance companies and the American 
Medical Association (AMA). The second opportunity came in the 1930s, when 
Roosevelt considered including health insurance in the Social Security legislation.  It 
was left out because the AMA again mobilized against it. Harry Truman’s effort to 
pass “compulsory health insurance” – probably not the best label – was derided as 
socialism. The next effort was in the 1960s, when reformers decided to start on 
universal insurance by providing coverage for the elderly.  This bill faced less 
opposition because the insurance companies didn’t really want to cover expensive, 
older, sick people – but Medicare did not lead to insurance for everyone.  In fact, it 
pulled a major voting bloc, seniors, out of the fight for reform and gave conservatives 
a new scare tactic, convincing the elderly that Medicare might be cut back to pay for 
other people. In the 1970s, under Nixon and Carter, Democrats refused to accept a 
better deal than they would get now. And then there was the spectacular failure in 
1993-94 under Hilary and Bill Clinton, which led to a Republican takeover of the 
Congress. 
Thanks to this century of failed reform, the United States has been left with 
a system that is very unusual by international standards. Between the late 1800s 
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and the end of World War II, most other advanced-industrial nations created 
systems of universal health insurance coverage.  In America, a patchwork of policies 
leaves more than 46 million Americans uninsured.  Most working-age people get 
their health insurance through their employers, while federal programs provide 
coverage for the elderly, the poor and near-poor, and for military veterans. And we 
pay an enormous premium for this inefficient, piecemeal system.  The United States 
spends about twice as much per person as other industrial countries do on average, 
and more than fifty percent more than the next-biggest spender, Switzerland.   
The complex system also disguises high risks.  For doctors, getting paid 
requires filling out thousands of forms, without the certainty that an insurer will 
agree to pay. Hospitals have to cope with an unpredictable influx of uninsured 
people who appear in their emergency rooms. And many Americans, even those who 
are insured, face the risk that an illness can wipe out the family savings.   In fact, 
catastrophic health care costs are the leading cause of bankruptcy in America. 
Despite the complexities and costs of the existing private and public 
patchwork that makes up the nation’s health care system, Democrats were 
committed to modifying the system rather than replacing it root and branch. Many 
supporters of health reform would prefer a “single payer” system like Canada’s, 
where the government handles all payments for health services delivered by private 
doctors and hospitals.  Democratic Presidents and elected officials may agree that 
such a system would be more efficient and less costly in principle, but in practice 
they are not prepared to disrupt existing arrangements between employers and 
private insurance companies (which are major employers in their own right). So 
Democrats since the 1970s have advocated reforms in existing arrangements.  But 
preserving the employer core of the system also means taking a very mature system 
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and simultaneously trying to improve its efficiency while expanding its reach. It 
means trying to squeeze out the resources to cover the uninsured, while readjusting 
existing institutions to operate more effectively and at lower cost.  
This is a heavy lift politically. Most Americans do not believe that you can 
pay for forty-six million more people and save money at the same time. No health 
economists will convince them otherwise. Even more telling, many powerful groups 
and economic interests have a stake in the current broken system – where one 
person’s waste is another’s cherished benefit or corporate profit.  Insurance 
companies, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and hospital systems all find aspects of 
the current health system very profitable, indeed.  Unions, too, have a strong 
incentive to protect the very expensive health plans that generations of workers had 
fought for.  During the health reform battles of 2009 and early 2010, each of these 
powerful lobbies could stand in the way of critical legislative provisions.  And each 
interest found it easy to run advertisements preying on public skepticism and 
aiming to convince people that reform would negatively affect their own health care. 
The challenges of a health care fight were certainly clear in the minds of the 
Democrats in Congress and in the White House, especially those who had lived 
through the failed reform of the Clinton years.8  One could easily imagine, 
particularly given the deepening economic crisis, that health care would get pushed 
from the top of the agenda.  And yet Obama declared during the campaign and early 
in his presidency that he would make health care reform a priority in his first term.  
This was a long-standing Democratic Party priority, and the competition with Hilary 
Rodham Clinton in the Democratic primaries had cemented this issue as something 
that Obama had to act on in year one.  Within the White House, moreover, fixing 
health care was perceived as a necessary component of a larger plan to put the 
 16 
federal budget in order. So in the early weeks of President Obama’s administration, 
the decision was made to move forward with comprehensive health care reform – 
tackling expanded access and cost controls at the same time.   
The Obama Administration approached health care reform with a three-part 
strategy.  First, the White House outlined only general, popular principles to define 
what health care reform would look like, and left the details to Congress.  Second, 
the Administration tried to sideline the likely opponents of new health care 
legislation by protecting or replacing some of the profits threatened by reform. 
Finally, the Administration focused on the financial aspects of health care reform, 
promoting far more specific proposals about how to pay for health care reform than 
how to implement it.  Each of these strategies was designed to promote 
comprehensive reform in an environment of entrenched opposition. 
Featuring broad principles was an attempt to avoid “fighting the last war.”  
When President Clinton had sought health care reform, the Administration had 
assembled a 500-person presidential commission headed by Hilary Rodham Clinton, 
and presented a 1,342-page document to the Congress in the fall of his first year in 
the presidency.  The plan was so complex that nobody could understand it – except 
the people who were going lose out under the new system, and they mobilized very 
effectively against it.  Not only did the entire reform get nixed – legislation did not 
make it out of a single committee – but the debacle helped sweep the Republicans 
into Congress in the fall of 1994.  Determined not to repeat that mistake this time, 
Obama decided instead to give speeches outlining broad, popular principles—health 
care for more people, insurance that is more reliable, cost containment for business 
and lower prices for families, and better benefits for the uninsured and the elderly.  
When it came to specific provisions – such as an individual mandate requiring 
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everyone to purchase insurance; expansions of Medicare; or the so-called “public 
option” to set up competition between public and private insurance plans for 
working-aged Americans – the Administration left the fight to Congressional 
Democrats.  The aim was to let Congressional committees work out compromises 
that could actually pass the House and the Senate. 
The Obama Administration did intervene, however, to try to manage and defuse 
longstanding interests opposed to health care reform.  On March 5, 2009, the White 
House held a forum on health care reform that included representatives from 
insurance companies, doctors and hospital groups, and the pharmaceutical industry.  
In their talks with health sector representatives, the White House had some 
leverage. Health care reform held risks for industry groups, particularly to the 
extent that it held down medical spending – but it also held new opportunities for 
profits.  To the extent that reform insured more Americans, it also opened up a new 
customer base. So the Obama Administration worked with the health care sector to 
get them on board with reform; and the strategy worked to a considerable degree.  
By May 2009, six major advocates in the health care industry signed onto a letter 
nominally supporting reform of health care and offering some voluntary cost-cutting 
measures.9 Though they continued to lobby actively to increase their profits under 
the new reform, these interests did largely avoid the kind of public opposition that 
derailed the Clinton health care reform.  
The Obama Administration also had some success getting concessions from 
popularly based interest groups.  The Obama Administration worked with AARP to 
ensure seniors saw benefits from health care reform, including the closure of the gap 
in Medicare prescription drug coverage known as the “donut hole.”  After a great 
deal of effort, the Administration also convinced the unions to accept some very 
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limited taxes on the most expensive health care plans – a policy Obama himself had 
opposed during the campaign.  The White House insistence on including some kind 
of “Cadillac tax,” as this measure was called, was partly about raising revenue to 
finance reform, and even more about creating credible cost controls for the future.   
When it came to asking for other kinds of financial concessions to help cover 
the cost of extending insurance, the Obama Administration had failures as well as 
successes. For instance, early in 2009, Obama proposed to equalize the charitable 
tax deduction for wealthy people and less wealthy people; this would reduce 
Treasury losses currently incurred when the wealthy are giving more generous 
deductions for their charitable giving.  Again, as with higher education reform, this 
might seem a logical step to take to squeeze out more resources to help provide 
health insurance for all Americans. But even though the research shows that most 
wealthy people would give almost as much to charities with or without a special 
deduction, that didn’t matter.10  Democratic constituencies in the nonprofit 
community nixed that policy right from the get-go.  This was a clear-cut instance of 
supposedly “liberal” groups fighting to retain privileges, even if that meant less 
money to help lower and middle-income Americans.  The dilemma of reforming an 
already established system does not just pit liberals against conservatives, or 
against business, but liberals against liberals – as demonstrated by both the fight 
with the unions over the Cadillac tax, and the fight with nonprofits over upper-
income charitable deductions.  
So far, we’ve seen two strategies from the Obama Administration that served 
to appease entrenched opponents of health care reform: compromise with major 
opponents and flexibility on the structure of reform.   Overall, however, the Obama 
administration intervened more specifically and more often when it came to paying 
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for reform, and adding up the costs and revenues.  The White House had to make 
adjustments repeatedly, but they paid continuing attention to the total price tag and 
the sources of savings or revenues to pay the costs of reform. 
For a number of reasons, the “number crunchers” played a prominent role in 
guiding Obama Administration strategy during the battle for health care reform.  
The memory of the Clinton reform effort led White House strategists to emphasize 
the importance of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the nonpartisan federal 
agency tasked with calculating the budget impact of legislative proposals.  A bad 
(that is to say, high-cost) CBO “score” can be a death knell for bills in Congress.  
Moreover, a key player in the Obama cabinet was Peter Orszag, the former CBO 
director who now runs the White House’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 
Orszag’s significance in the health care debate was only increased by his relatively 
rapid Senate confirmation at the start of the Obama Administration, as Obama’s 
first nomination for Director of Health and Human Services, Tom Daschle, 
foundered. 
When it came to financing health care reform, Obama was quite specific in 
his recommendations.  The first Obama budget, released at the end of February 
2009, included more than $600 million in new taxes and cost-cutting measures, 
intended as a “down payment” on health care reform.  In June, Obama sent a letter 
to Senate committee chairmen Max Baucus and Edward Kennedy, in which he spoke 
in the broadest terms about what benefits should be included in health care reform, 
but explicitly outlining the budget cuts and tax increases he would recommend to 
pay for the bill.  For instance, when it came to whether to include an individual 
mandate requiring people to have health insurance, Obama told the Senators he was 
“open” to their ideas.  But regarding cuts to Medicare spending, Obama specifically 
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reiterated his budget recommendations, and called for “another $200 to $300 billion” 
in cuts on top of his earlier recommendations. 
Focusing on the financing side of health care reform had important strategic 
consequences.  First of all, the cost-cutting provisions helped identify up front which 
entrenched interests were going to lose out in order to make health care reform 
affordable.  Obama’s advocacy on the funding sources also provided Democrats in 
Congress with support in the face of heavy industry lobbying, and cleared the way 
for negotiations.  Perhaps more important, setting a benchmark in terms of savings 
also created the room for some significant expenditures, and therefore expanded the 
scope of possible reform. 
 
[Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
 
Though progress was painfully slow, the Obama strategy – setting out 
principles, providing a lot of behind-the-scenes budget advice, and letting 
Congressional committees do their work – seemed to be proving its worth by late 
2009.  Relatively similar bills were passed in November by the House, and then, 
finally, just before Christmas, by the Senate.  As Figures 1 and 2 spell out, although 
there were differences between the two houses and between their bills and what the 
White House originally outlines, the final House and Senate bills met most of the 
principles the President laid out at the start of the battle for health care reform – 
increased affordable coverage, support for small businesses, an end to insurers’ most 
abusive practices, and a national exchange to encourage insurer competition.  The 
House bill was generally considered more liberal – it included a public option, more 
generous benefits, and higher taxes on the privileged.  But both bills fell relatively 
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close to the promises Obama had made during the campaign.  As of the end of 2009, 
it looked as if comprehensive health reform would soon appear on the President’s 
desk to be signed into law, after a few compromises were worked out between the 
House and the Senate early in 2010. 
  
How Scott Brown Threatened – and Then Strengthened – Health Reform 
 
Yet even this close to success, reform very nearly did not happen.  In mid-
January 2010, a special election was held to fill the Senate seat held for decades by a 
liberal champion of comprehensive health reform, Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts, 
who died in the late summer of 2009.  The election occurred just after unseemly 
deals were struck to get sixty votes to break a filibuster in the Senate, and at a time 
when Americans were increasingly angry about the deep economic downturn. Facing 
an inept Democratic opponent, Scott Brown promised to oppose costly deals in 
Washington DC and offered to protect Massachusetts, which already has universal 
health insurance coverage, from having to pay for benefits for people in other states. 
Brown won amidst low Democratic turnout, and with considerable support from blue 
collar workers – whose union leaders had spent the previous month complaining 
about health reform provisions that might reduce insurance benefits for unionized 
workers. The union leaders persuaded the White House to scrap most of these 
provisions, but the word did not get around before the Massachusetts election. 
After the surprise election of Scott Brown in Massachusetts, it looked very 
possible that, once again, as repeatedly over the past century, health reform would 
fail. Because of the threat of the filibuster, an evolution of Senate procedure beyond 
the original Constitutional scheme, major legislation required a 60-vote 
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supermajority to move forward.11   Brown’s election made him the 41st Republican, 
which all in his party pledged to vote against reform.  
For a time, the Democrats seemed paralyzed, despite their still sizable 
majorities in the House and the Senate. In due course, however, the Brown victory 
in Massachusetts spurred Democrats to cooperate to finish a bolder and more 
comprehensive health reform. Provoked in part by the announcement of huge 
insurance rate hikes – which reminded the public of the need for some new 
legislation to rein in insurance companies -- the President took the lead at a public 
health care summit convened in late February 2010. For the first time, President 
Obama advocated a fully fleshed out legislative approach – not coincidently, 
including the very provisions that the House and Senate bills already agreed upon.  
In taking responsibility for finishing health care reform, Obama gave the Democrats 
in Congress the cover they needed to put together a negotiated agreement between 
the House and Senate Democrats. 
Under the agreement they reached, the House would vote for the Senate’s 
version of the bill, and then pass a second “sidecar” bill that included a list of agreed-
upon fixes and improvements.  The House Democrats received a public promise from 
more than 50 Senate Democrats to support the sidecar bill, which they could pass 
with less than 60 votes by a process known as “reconciliation.”  An established 
procedure by which fiscal bills can avoid filibusters, reconciliation has been used 
repeatedly by Republicans to pass tax cuts and other policy priorities.  
 Ironically, the election of Scott Brown gave Congressional Democrats the 
leeway to use reconciliation -- and this meant that a more progressive reform could 
be enacted by majority, not supermajority, votes.  Though the reconciliation 
procedure did not allow changes in administrative or regulatory aspects of the 
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health reform bill passed by the Senate in late 2009, it did enable adjustments in 
fiscal matters.  In addition to removing a number of special deals – such as the 
Cornhusker Kickback that the Senate had used to get Ben Nelson’s vote in 
December 2009 -- the sidecar bill reduced and delayed the “Cadillac tax” on generous 
employee health plans, increased taxes on health care industries, and imposed 
higher taxes on the wealthiest Medicare beneficiaries. The final bill also folded in 
the student loan reforms that had previously be stalled by the Senate filibuster. This 
had the effect of moving federal dollars from the pockets of bankers to the students 
they were intended to help in the first place – and it also allowed some of the savings 
from reduced bank subsidies to be used to cover health reform costs and reduce the 
long-term federal budget deficit.   Thanks in part to this progressive measure, the 
Congressional Budget Office projected that health care reform would actually cut 
the federal deficit. The final health reform bills passed in late March 2010 had a 
much stronger redistributive component than the Senate legislation passed in 2009.  
Scott Brown’s election therefore backfired on the political intentions of his 
promoters, because it not only failed to prevent the enactment of health reform, it 
made it more generous toward average Americans, and shifted costs toward the 
wealthy. 
After some intricate maneuvering by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and House 
Speaker Nancy Pelosi, the House and Senate Democrats finally had the votes to pass 
health care reform – without the support of a single Republican.   The House passed 
the Senate’s health care reform by a vote of 219-212, and the sidecar bill by a vote of 
220-211.  The Senate, after a week of wrangling and delays, passed the 
reconciliation bill by a vote of 56-43. On Tuesday, March 23, 2010, several hundred 
people crowded into the East Room of the White House to watch President Barack 
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Obama sign into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care Act.  One 
week later, he signed the sidecar bill, and comprehensive health care reform was 
finally complete.  It was a major victory for Obama, who had declared at the very 
start of his campaign for the presidency, “I will judge my first term as president 
based on the fact on whether we have delivered the kind of health care that every 
American deserves.”12   The enactment of comprehensive health reform was also 
extraordinary against the backdrop of the previous century of failed efforts to 
accomplish similar changes in U.S. health care. 
 
The Next Fights Over Reform Implementation 
 
In many ways, of course, the enactment of the new laws in March 2010 
marked a beginning, not an end, a promise of accomplishment, not a fait accompli. 
Like Social Security and Medicare, Affordable Care is likely to face obstacles and 
redirections long after passage of the legislation itself.  Looking at the response so 
far to the passage of health care reform, we can discern the likely outlines of the 
upcoming battles over implementation.13   
After a year of confusing and ugly legislative wrangling, the public’s support 
for the new legislation is lukewarm, while on the far right, there is significant 
motivation to repeal the legislation entirely.  Analyst Nate Silver looked at multiple 
national polls conducted after the passage of health care reform and concluded that 
the bill itself had received a small bump in support, and that Democrats were doing 
“marginally better,” at least in comparison to their terrible approval rates as health 
care appeared to stall out.14  There was no overwhelming shift in support towards 
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the new health care law, nor towards its proponents.  Among the conservative base, 
however, the repeal of health care reform quickly became a rallying cry.  
Within hours of the passage of health care reform, more than a dozen 
conservative state officials, most of them candidates for office in fall 2010, rushed to 
court to argue that the new laws are unconstitutional.  Republicans in Congress 
promised their supporters a complete repeal of the new legislation.  For the midterm 
election, when turnout is heavily dependent on the party faithful, this could be an 
effective strategy. In any case, the history of incumbent losses in midterms suggests 
that the Democrats are almost guaranteed to lose seats in 2010, particularly in light 
of the struggling economy. A motivated Republican base could hand a major loss to 
Congressional Democrats, perhaps large enough to cede control of the House or the 
Senate to the Republicans, or at least spook conservative Democrats into derailing 
health care implementation. 
By the summer of 2010, cautious majorities of the American public seem 
more amenable to “wait and see” than total repeal – and many concrete steps have 
already been taken to implement Affordable Care through negotiations between the 
Obama administration and health insurance companies.  Even if Republicans win 
resoundingly in the fall 2010 Congressional elections, President Obama would veto 
any outright repeal legislation. Presumably, Republicans can elect a President in 
2012 and then try to repeal Affordable Care.  But by then, many Americans will be 
used to new insurance regulations that protect patients; young Americans will enjoy 
staying on parental health plans until age 26; older Americans will enjoy enhanced 
prescription drug coverage under Medicare; and millions of lower and lower-middle 
income Americans will have health coverage through Medicaid or by purchasing 
plans on the new health insurance exchanges. Some Republican strategists have 
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worried publicly that pushing a repeal might alienate more moderate voters, 
especially after the quick implementation of more visible and popular provisions.15 
Instead of repeal, gradual chipping away at tax and regulatory and benefit 
provisions is more likely. Many of the most redistributive policies in the health care 
reform package do not come into effect until 2014.  It is not impossible that the tax 
increases on the wealthy and the subsidies for lower-income Americans could shrink 
before they are ever delivered, if Congresses dominated by Republicans, or by 
Republicans and conservative Democrats, take a series of quiet actions to modify the 
reform framework enacted in 2010.   
In the end, much of the fight over implementation is likely to happen in a 
less-visible arena: the states.  Affordable Care, in its final version, called for state-
level health insurance marketplaces, rather than creating a national exchange.  In 
states dominated by conservatives, and where administrative capacity is weak, it 
will be relatively easy for lobbyists to undercut Affordable Care’s new consumer 
protections.  On the other hand, in states with strong progressive majorities, it may 
be possible to create highly effective health insurance exchanges that can serve as 
models to other states.  The effectiveness of the health insurance exchange 
provision, therefore, is likely to vary across state lines – and it may be many years 
before we know whether particular state solutions to widespread problems of access 
and cost can serve as a model for additional states or the nation as a whole. 
 
Conclusion 
 
How ever the future implementation struggles play out, the passage of 
Affordable Care in 2010 is a remarkable achievement – enough to make a least a 
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partial case that Barack Obama and the Democrats in Congress during 2009 and 
2010 have fashioned parts of another New Deal.  In a highly partisan atmosphere, in 
the midst of a burgeoning economic crisis, and with comparatively small majority 
compared to other Democratic presidents who have pushed through major social 
reforms, Obama sailed through a sea of entrenched interests and secured a wide-
ranging and remarkably progressive health care bill, a bill that draws resources 
from the privileged to spread access to affordable health insurance to most of the 
U.S. citizenry. But Affordable Care is a blueprint far from fully implemented, and 
the bitter politics of comprehensive health reform continues. In the coming months 
and years, we will see to what extent the promise of Affordable Care can be made a 
reality.
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Strongest Provision      Weakest Provision 
 
The Trajectory of Health Care Reform: 
Major Benefits 
 
 OBAMA PLAN HOUSE BILL SENATE BILL FINAL LAW 
 Drawn from Obama’s 
platform as a presidential 
candidatei and his proposals 
during his first six months as 
president. 
HR 3962: Affordable Health 
Care for America Act 
Passed: 11/7/09 
HR 3590: Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act 
Passed: 12/24/09 
PL 111-148: Patient 
Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, as amended by the 
Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act 
Universal Coverage 
Overall increase in 
coverage from the 
current rate (83% of 
legal U.S. residents 
under 65).ii   
In his campaign, Obama 
called for a mandate that 
all children 
have health care 
coverage.  His 
FY2010 budget 
proposal 
suggested that 
health care 
reform should 
“aim for 
universality.”iii 
96% covered. 94% covered.  95% covered. 
Competition to Make 
Care More Affordable 
 
Obama supported 
the creation of 
a National 
Health Insurance  
Exchange, and 
the 
establishment of 
a public  
insurance 
program. iv 
Sets up a national 
insurance exchange 
marketplace. 
 
Includes a public option 
to compete with private 
health insurance plans.  
 
Would remove the health 
industry exemption from 
antitrust legislation. 
Sets up state-based 
insurance exchange 
marketplaces. 
 
Does not include a 
public option or remove 
the health industry 
antitrust exemption. 
Sets up state-based 
insurance exchange 
marketplaces. 
 
Does not include a 
public option or remove 
the health industry 
antitrust exemption. 
Strongest Provision      Weakest Provision 
 
 OBAMA PLAN HOUSE BILL SENATE BILL FINAL LAW 
Support for Low-to-
Middle Income 
Americans  
The federal poverty line 
(FPL) was set in 2009 
at $10,830 for a single 
person and $22,050 for 
a family of four.   
As a candidate, 
Obama called for 
the expansion of 
Medicaid and 
SCHIP programs.  
In addition, 
under his plan, 
“individuals and 
families who do 
not qualify for 
Medicaid or 
SCHIP  
but still need 
assistance will 
receive income-
related federal 
subsidies to 
keep health 
insurance 
premiums 
affordable.”v 
Expand Medicaid to all 
under 65 with incomes 
up to 150% of the FPL. 
 
To families with 
incomes between 133 
and 400% of the FPL, 
provide tiered premium 
credits so families 
contribute between 3 and 
12% of income to paying 
for insurance, and 
subsidies to cover up to 
97% of medical costs. 
Expand Medicaid to all 
under 65 with incomes 
up to 133% of the FPL. 
 
To families between 133 
and 400% of the FPL, 
provide tiered premium 
credits so families 
contribute between 2 and 
12% of income to paying 
for insurance.  To 
families between 100 
and 200% of the FPL, 
provide a sliding scale of 
credits to cover up to 
90% of medical costs. 
Expand Medicaid to all 
under 65 with incomes 
up to 133% of the FPL. 
 
To families between 133 
and 400% of the FPL, 
provide tiered premium 
credits so families 
contribute between 2 and 
9.5% of income to 
paying for insurance, 
and subsidies to cover up 
to 94% of medical costs. 
Strongest Provision      Weakest Provision 
 
 OBAMA PLAN HOUSE BILL SENATE BILL FINAL LAW 
Support for Young 
Adults and the Elderly 
As a candidate, Obama 
supported closing the 
donut hole gap in 
Medicare prescription 
drug benefits,vi and 
recommended 
allowing those 
up to age 25 to 
stay on their  
parents’ health 
insurance 
plans.vii   
 
 
 
Over a ten year period, 
closes the “donut hole.”  
 
Children can stay on 
their parents’ plans until 
age 27. 
 
Insurance companies 
cannot charge more than 
twice as much for older 
people’s premiums 
compared to those they 
offer younger people.  
Reduces but does not 
close the “donut hole.”viii 
 
 
Children can stay on 
their parents’ plans until 
age 26. 
 
Insurance companies 
cannot charge more than 
three times as much for 
older people’s premiums 
compared to those they 
offer younger people. 
Closes the “donut hole” 
gap in Medicare 
prescription drug 
benefits by 2020.ix 
 
Children can stay on 
their parents’ plans until 
age 26. 
 
Insurance companies 
cannot charge more than 
three times as much for 
older people’s premiums 
compared to those they 
offer younger people. 
Effective Regulation “No American 
will be turned 
away from any 
insurance plan 
because of 
illness or pre-
existing 
conditions.” 
Effective in 2010, 
prevents insurance 
companies from 
charging women higher 
premiums than men, 
excluding customers 
because of a “pre-
existing condition,” 
rescinding a policy when 
a person becomes sick.   
Prevents insurance 
companies from 
charging women higher 
premiums than men, 
excluding customers 
because of a “pre-
existing condition,” 
rescinding a policy when 
a person becomes sick.  
Effective in 2010 for 
children, 2014 for adults. 
Prevents insurance 
companies from 
charging women higher 
premiums than men, 
excluding customers 
because of a “pre-
existing condition,” 
rescinding a policy when 
a person becomes sick.  
Effective in 2010 for 
children, 2014 for adults. 
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Strongest Provision        Weakest Provision 
 
The Trajectory of Health Care Reform:  
Major Financing Provisions 
 
 OBAMA 
PROPOSAL 
HOUSE BILL SENATE 
FINANCE 
SENATE BILL FINAL LAW 
 Drawn from Obama’s 
platform as a 
presidential candidatei 
and his proposals 
during his first six 
months as president. 
HR 3962: Affordable 
Health Care for 
America Act 
Passed: 11/7/09 
America’s Healthy 
Future Act (as amended 
in Senate Finance 
Committee) 
Announced: 9/17/09 
HR 3590: Patient 
Protection and 
Affordable Care Act 
Passed: 12/24/09 
PL 111-148: Patient 
Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, as 
amended by the Health 
Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act 
High-Earner Tax: 
Tax increases for 
the wealthiest 
Americans. 
Proposes tax 
increases (including 
a reduction in the 
mortgage interest 
and charitable 
deductions) for 
those making over 
$250,000.  
Estimated ten-year 
revenue: $318 
billion.ii 
Institute a 5.4% 
increase the income 
tax on individuals 
earning more than 
$500,000 or 
families earning 
over $1 million.  
Estimated ten-year 
revenue: $460 
billion.iii 
None. Increase Medicare 
tax rate from 1.45 
to 2.35% for 
individuals earning 
over $200,000 and 
couples earning 
over $250,000.  
Estimated ten-year 
revenue: $87 
billion.iv 
For individuals 
earning over 
$200,000 and 
couples earning 
over $250,000, 
increase Medicare 
tax rate from 1.45 
to 2.35% and 
institute a 3.8% tax 
on unearned 
income.  Estimated 
ten-year revenue: 
$210 billion. v 
Strongest Provision        Weakest Provision 
 
 OBAMA 
PROPOSAL 
HOUSE BILL SENATE 
FINANCE 
SENATE BILL FINAL LAW 
Cuts to 
Government-
Guaranteed 
Corporate Profits 
Reductions in 
overpayments to 
insurance 
companies, health 
care providers, 
drug companies,vi 
and student loan 
bankers. 
FY2010 budget 
proposes health 
care savings 
totaling $316 
billion, including 
$177 billion in 
savings from 
Medicare 
Advantage 
overpayments.vii  In 
June 2009, Obama 
calls for an 
additional $309 
billion in savings 
from Medicare and 
Medicaid.viii 
Reduce Medicare 
overspending by 
$440 billion over 10 
years, including 
$170 billion in 
Medicare 
Advantage 
savings.ix  
Reduce Medicare 
overspending by 
$404 billion over 
ten years, including 
$117 billion from 
Medicare 
Advantage.x  
Reduce Medicare 
overspending by 
$395-$400 billion 
over 10 years, 
including $118 
billion in savings 
from Medicare 
Advantage.xi  
Reduce Medicare 
overspending by 
$390 billion over 10 
years, including 
$136 billion in 
savings from 
Medicare 
Advantage.xii 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Originally a separate piece of legislation, student loan reform was highlighted by 
the President in his first State of the Union and passed by the House in September 2009, 
but stalled in the Senate until a version was included with the final vote on health care 
reform. 
Restructure student 
loan process, 
cutting middlemen 
bankers (who profit 
from government-
guaranteed student 
loans), saving $61 
billion over 10 
years.xiii 
Strongest Provision        Weakest Provision 
 
 OBAMA 
PROPOSAL 
HOUSE BILL SENATE 
FINANCE 
SENATE BILL FINAL LAW 
Industry Fees: 
Annual fees and 
taxes affecting 
health sector 
companies. 
In May 2009, 
President Obama 
meets with health 
sector companies, 
and claims to have 
secured voluntary 
pledges from the 
industry to cut 
national health-care 
spending by 1.5 
percentage points 
each year, but the 
plan lacks detail.xiv 
2.5% tax on 
medical devices. 
Fees include an 
annual fee of $2.3 
billion for drug 
companies, $4 
billion for medical 
device companies, 
and $6.7 billion for 
insurance 
companies.  
Estimated ten-year 
revenue: $88-93 
billion.xv 
Fees include an 
annual fee of $2.3 
billion for drug 
companies, $2 
billion for medical 
device companies 
(rising to $3 billion 
after 2017), and a 
tiered fee system 
for insurance 
companies:  $2B in 
2011, $4B in 2012, 
$7B in 2013, $9B in 
2014-2016, and 
$10B thereafter. 
 
10% tax on tanning 
salons. 
Fees include a 2.3% 
tax on medical 
devices, and a 
tiered fee system 
for drug and 
insurance 
companies.  
Insurance industry 
payments are 
delayed until 2014, 
but are linked to 
premium growth.  
These changes are 
expected to raise 
about $6B more 
than the Senate bill 
over 10 years, and 
more thereafter.xvi 
 
10% tax on tanning 
salons. 
Strongest Provision        Weakest Provision 
 
 OBAMA 
PROPOSAL 
HOUSE BILL SENATE 
FINANCE 
SENATE BILL FINAL LAW 
Cadillac Tax: 
Tax on the most 
expensive health 
plans. 
None.  Obama 
strongly opposed a 
tax on health care 
plans during his 
campaign, attacking 
Senator McCain for 
his support of such 
a proposal. 
None. On most health 
plans valued at over 
$8,000 for an 
individual or 
$21,000 for a 
family, there is a 
tax set at 40% of 
plan value.  The 
provision is 
effective as of 
2013, and linked to 
inflation.  Estimated 
revenue: $210 
billion.xvii 
On most health 
plans valued at over 
$8,500 for an 
individual or 
$23,000 for a 
family, there is a 
tax set at 40% of 
plan value.  The 
provision is 
effective as of 
2013, and linked to 
inflation.  Estimated 
revenue: $149 
billion.xviii 
On most health 
plans valued at over 
$10,200 for an 
individual or 
$27,500 for a 
family, there is a 
tax set at 40% of 
plan value.  The 
provision is 
effective as of 
2018, and linked to 
inflation after 2020.  
Estimated revenue: 
$32 billion.xix 
Strongest Provision        Weakest Provision 
 
 OBAMA 
PROPOSAL 
HOUSE BILL SENATE 
FINANCE 
SENATE BILL FINAL LAW 
Free-rider 
Penalty: 
Penalties on 
individuals without 
qualifying 
coverage and large 
employers not 
providing 
coverage. 
Obama never 
explicitly endorsed 
an individual or 
employer mandate, 
calling only for a 
“plan that put the 
United States on a 
clear path to cover 
all Americans.”xx  
In response to the 
Committees plans 
to introduce a 
mandate, Obama 
emphasized the 
need to make plans 
affordable to 
individuals and 
small businesses.xxi  
Uninsured would 
pay 2.5% of 
household adjusted 
income up to cost 
of national 
premium basic plan.   
 
Employers must 
cover 72.5% of 
premium for an 
individual or 65% 
for a family, or pay 
8% of payroll into 
the Health 
Insurance Exchange 
Trust Fund.  
Employers with 
payroll less than 
$500k are exempt, 
and fees are lower 
than 8% for 
businesses with a 
payroll less than 
$750k.  
 
Estimated ten year 
revenue: $168 
billion.xxii 
 
 
Uninsured would 
pay a tax of $750 
per adult per year.  
 
Employers with 
more than 50 
employees not 
offering coverage 
pay a fee based on 
the average national 
tax credit for each 
employee receiving 
a tax credit, or $400 
times the total 
number of 
employees in the 
firm.   
 
Estimated ten-year 
revenue: $27 
billion.xxiii 
 
 
Uninsured would 
pay a tax equal to 
the greater of 2% of 
household adjusted 
income or $750 per 
person up to $2250.   
 
Employers with 
more than 50 
employees not 
offering coverage 
who have at least 
one employee 
receiving a tax 
credit pay $750 per 
full-time employee.  
If employer does 
offer coverage, they 
must pay the lesser 
of $3000 for each 
tax credit or $750 
per employee. 
Employers offering 
coverage must offer 
vouchers for 
employees below 
400% of the federal 
poverty line who 
buy on the 
exchange. 
Additional fees for 
long waiting 
periods for 
coverage. 
 
Estimated revenue: 
$39 billion.xxiv 
Uninsured would 
pay a tax equal to 
the greater of 2% of 
household adjusted 
income or $695 per 
person up to $2085.   
 
 
Employers with 
more than 50 
employees not 
offering coverage 
who have at least 
one employee 
receiving a tax 
credit pay $2000 
times the number of 
full time employees 
minus 30.  If 
employer does offer 
coverage, they must 
pay the lesser of 
$3000 for each tax 
credit or $2000 
times the number of 
full time employees 
minus 30.   
Employers offering 
coverage must offer 
vouchers for 
employees below 
400% FPL who buy 
on the exchange. 
 
Estimated revenue: 
$65 billion.xxv 
Strongest Provision        Weakest Provision 
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